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strategic costsZahavi's handicap hypothesis (Grafen, 1990; Zahavi, 1975;
Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997) is a popular explanation for the evolution
of honest and costly signalling. The general idea is that individuals
honestly signal their quality because signalling is costly and
therefore low-quality individuals cannot afford to produce
dishonest signals. However, this hypothesis is controversial for
several reasons. (1) Zahavi suggested that selection favours the
evolution of honest signalling because (and not despite) of their
costs, and hemade the radical suggestion that when it comes to the
evolution of signalling, natural selection favours waste rather than
efﬁciency. (2) Zahavi argued that this idea is a general principle, not
merely a hypothesis, which explains honest signalling in most or all
contexts. (3) There are several versions of the handicap hypothesis,
but attempts to provide theoretical support have largely failed. The
main exception is a model proposed by Grafen (1990), which has
become widely accepted among behavioural ecologists; however,
his conclusions have been challenged (Bergstrom, Szamado, &
Lachmann, 2002; Getty, 1998, 2006; Hurd, 1995; Lachmann,
Szamado, & Bergstrom, 2001; Szamado, 1999, 2000, 2011). (4)
There have been many attempts to empirically test the handicap* Correspondence: D. J. Penn, Konrad Lorenz Institute of Ethology, Department of
Integrative Biology and Evolution, University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna,
Savoyenstraße 1a, A-1160 Vienna, Austria.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).hypothesis, but there is no consensus regarding how it might be
tested (Kotiaho, 2001).
Despite these difﬁculties, Polnaszek and Stephens (2014)
recently conducted a study with trained blue jays, Cyanocitta cris-
tata, to experimentally test the handicap hypothesis. They
concluded that their ﬁndings provide the ﬁrst experimental evi-
dence that signal costs enforce honesty, and they interpreted their
results to support the handicap principle. This experiment is un-
usually clever and insightful, and the ﬁndings provide important
implications for honest signalling and receiver psychology
(Guilford & Dawkins, 1991). However, we raise several caveats
about the theoretical background, interpretations and conclusions
of the study, and we explain why this study and other attempts to
test the handicap hypothesis will be problematic as long as there is
not a clear theoretical model to test.THE JAY TRAINING EXPERIMENT
In this experiment, pairs of blue jays occupying adjacent cages
were trained to play a communication game in which one bird, the
sender, could choose to hop onto one of two perches, which could
be used as a signal about the state of the environment, and the
receiver responded by selecting a perch on the same or opposite
side of the sender, depending upon the signal it perceived
(Polnaszek & Stephens, 2014). The sender could choose to send an
honest or dishonest signal about the environment, depending on
whether one of the two red lights in the signaller's cage (visible
only for the signaller) were turned on or off indicating the state for
the given trial as either true or false. The birds were experimentally
rewarded depending on their choices and they were tested under
two conditions. In the incentives-aligned treatment, there was
mutual interest between signaller and receiver, as both birds were
rewarded for choosing a response that corresponded to the state of
the environment. In the incentives-opposed treatment, there was a
conﬂict of interest, as the signaller was interested in selecting the
signal state regardless of the state of the environment, whereas the
receiver was only rewarded if the response corresponded to the
state of the environment. The authors also experimentally manip-
ulated the cost of signalling by forcing the sender to take loops ofimal Behaviour by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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it could use the signalling or the nonsignalling perch. The authors
showed that when there was no conﬂict (incentives-aligned
treatment), the jays produced honest signals, and increasing cost of
the signals had no effect on honesty. However, when they increased
the conﬂict (incentives-opposed treatments), increasing the sig-
nalling costs affected their honesty: when the costs of signalling
were low, theywere often dishonest (not corresponding to the state
of the environment), whereas when the costs of signalling
increased, the jays produced more honest signals. The study also
showed that the receivers followed or trusted the signals more
often when they were reliable. The authors concluded that their
study provides the ﬁrst experimental evidence demonstrating that
signal costs stabilize honesty, and they imply that this ﬁnding
conﬁrms the handicap principle.
ZAHAVI'S HANDICAP PRINCIPLE
Rather than supporting Zahavi's handicap principle (Zahavi &
Zahavi, 1997), the ﬁndings in this study contradict this proposal.
The costs of signalling stabilized honesty, but only when there was
a conﬂict of interest between signaller and receivers. To our
knowledge, this study provides the ﬁrst experimental evidence that
signals need not be costly to be honest under shared interests, and
that signal cost has no effect on honesty under such conditions. This
result is theoretically expected, but it contradicts suggestions that
the handicap hypothesis is a general principle that explains honest
signalling (with and without conﬂicts of interest; Zahavi & Zahavi,
1997). Also, Zahavi assumed that honest signals must be percep-
tibly costly or wasteful, since this is the only way to demonstrate
honesty, and yet the birds' shuttle ﬂights (the costs that maintained
honesty) could not be seen by the receivers. There are other
restricted versions of the handicap hypothesis, but as we explain
next, these models were not supported either.
HANDICAPS AS STRATEGIC COSTS
The jay study was also interpreted to support a version of the
handicap hypothesis proposed by Maynard Smith and Harper
(1995), which views handicaps as strategic costs of signalling, and
Polnaszek and Stephens (2014, p. 2) deﬁned handicaps accordingly,
i.e. ‘any signal whose reliability is ensured by costs that exceed the
minimal cost necessary to make the signal’. All signals have pro-
duction or efﬁcacy costs, which are necessary for a trait to transmit
information or inﬂuence the behaviour of conspeciﬁcs, and the
Maynard Smith and Harper (1995) version crucially predicts that
they have additional strategic costs (the cost component that
maintains honesty under conﬂict of interests). A cricket's song is
costly to produce to reach females from afar (production costs), but
the question is whether the males' songs are more costly than they
need to be to reach female receivers. Do gazelles jump higher than
they need to jump to signal their health to predators when stot-
ting? No one has proposed how to measure such strategic costs,
and the jay experiment did not attempt to distinguish strategic
versus efﬁcacy costs of signalling, which is the basis for this deﬁ-
nition of handicaps.
THE STRATEGIC HANDICAP HYPOTHESIS
Polnaszek and Stephens (2014, p. 6) also cited Grafen's (1990)
strategic handicap hypothesis as the ‘authoritative mathematical
statement of the handicap principle’; however, criticisms of his
model (Getty, 1998, 2006) and conclusions (Hurd, 1995; Lachmann
et al., 2001; Szamado, 1999, 2011) were too lightly brushed off.
Grafen's (1990) main results were that (1) signals are honest, (2)signals are costly and (3) signals are costlier for worse signallers,
and yet these conditions have all been challenged by later models
and empirical results (see Szamado, 2011 for a review). Signals need
not be honest, not even on average, to evolve (Szamado, 2000).
Honest signals need not be costly even under conﬂicts of interest
(Bergstrom et al., 2002; Hurd, 1995; Lachmann et al., 2001;
Szamado, 1999) and honest costly signals need not be costlier for
poor-quality signallers (Getty, 1998, 2006).
It is also unclear how the jay experiment provides evidence or a
test of Grafen's strategic handicapmodel. The versions of the model
proposed by Grafen (1990) and Zahavi and Zahavi (1997) assume
that the costs of signalling that enforce honesty are a strategic
choice (where individuals can choose their level of investment)
rather than an unavoidable constraint imposed on the signallers,
for example high-quality signallers could use low-intensity signals
but they ‘choose’ not to and vice versa. However, in the jay exper-
iment costs of shuttle ﬂights were artiﬁcially forced on the sig-
nallers: the birds could not use the signalling perch before paying
the full cost of the signal. In addition, an experimental test requires
showing that the marginal cost of producing the same signal is
greater for low- than high-quality individuals, but this hypothesis
was not tested for two reasons. First, the quality or condition of the
birds was not known or examined, and quality was only mimicked
by imposing two different conditions (‘true’ versus ‘false’) on the
jays, which were signalled by red lights. This implementation is
irrelevant to the jays' ability to bear the cost of signalling. Second,
themodel in the jay study is a differential beneﬁt model (like the Sir
Phylip Sydney game, Maynard Smith, 1991), rather than a differ-
ential cost model (Grafen, 1990). The costs imposed on the signal-
lers were the same in the two different conditions, and thus, by
deﬁnition, there cannot be any difference in the marginal costs.
ACTION-RESPONSE GAME VERSUS HANDICAP MODEL
The authors constructed a simplemodel to derive the conditions
of honesty for the jay experiment, and they cited Grafen's model
(1990) as the ‘authoritative cost condition’ (Polnaszek & Stephens,
2014, p. 3) of honesty. However, the authors' model is an example of
an action-response game (Hurd, 1995; Szamado, 1999) rather than
a handicap model, and the conditions of honesty that can be
derived from these games are different (see Appendix). The results
of action-response games show that honest signals need not be
costly not even under conﬂict of interest for high-quality signallers
(Bergstrom et al., 2002; Hurd, 1995; Lachmann et al., 2001;
Szamado, 1999), contrary to previous authors' claims (Grafen,
1990; Maynard Smith & Harper, 1995; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997),
assuming that signal costs vary as a function of quality. The
explanation is that it is not the cost paid by ‘high-quality’, i.e. true
condition, signallers at the equilibrium that maintains honesty, but
the potential cost of cheating for ‘low-quality signallers’, i.e. false
condition (Hurd, 1995; Szamado, 1999). This potential cost of
cheating will be paid at the equilibrium for high-quality signallers
only if there is a constraint linking the signal cost paid by low-
quality signallers to the cost paid by high-quality signallers.
In terms of the jay experiment, if the experimenters impose a
cost only on the ‘false’ condition, the system still remains honest
and individuals under the ‘true’ condition (i.e., ‘high-quality’ in-
dividuals) do not have to pay a cost at the equilibrium. Conse-
quently, if individuals pay a cost under the ‘true’ condition, then it is
only because the constraint imposed by the experimenters was
chosen that way (i.e. they implemented a differential beneﬁt
model). Therefore, results of the experiment cannot be used as
evidence in favour of the necessity of such cost (as assumed by the
handicap models), as it only reﬂects the choice made by the
experimenters.
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ARE SUCH INDICES HANDICAPS?
The ﬁndings in the jay experiment are more consistent with
another explanation for the evolution of honest signalling called
the ‘index hypothesis’ (Maynard Smith & Harper, 1995; Maynard
Smith & Harper, 2004). This hypothesis assumes that honesty is
enforced due to physical, developmental or physiological con-
straints that cannot be cheated, rather than additional costs that
evolve on top of the (efﬁcacy) costs required to produce a minimal
signal. Because the costs of signalling were experimentally
manipulated, as an unavoidable constraint, the ﬁndings are more
consistent with the index hypothesis than the handicap hypothesis
(Grafen, 1990; Maynard Smith & Harper, 1995). The index hy-
pothesis is not controversial, but it is not considered to be a version
of the handicap hypothesis, and classifying it as such would require
redeﬁning the handicap hypothesis.
TESTING EVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESES WITH ARTIFICIAL
LEARNING EXPERIMENTS?
Finally, we raise additional caveats about using such learning
experiments for testing the handicap hypothesis, or any other ideas
about the evolution of animal signals, i.e. adaptive behaviours,
morphology or other phenotypic features that function to inﬂuence
the behaviour of receivers (Maynard Smith & Harper, 1995; Searcy
& Nowicki, 2005). The experimental design was set up to copy the
structure of general action-response games, yet the elements of this
game (the state of nature, the action used as a signal, the cost and
the beneﬁt) were all artiﬁcial (i.e. red light, perch hopping, ﬂying
loops and food pellets). It is unclear whether the signal in this study
(perch hopping) functions as a signal in jays or other species.
Moreover, it is unclear how such learning experiments can directly
test hypotheses about the evolution of animal signals. Polnaszek &
Stephens (2014, p. 6) acknowledged that their approach was a
‘fairly drastic departure’ and ‘radically different, from the traditions
of ‘costly signalling’ research’. To justify their methods, the authors
pointed out that there are similarities between learning and evo-
lution and new approaches are needed to test the handicap hy-
pothesis. We agreewith all of these points, but it is still unclear how
this learning experiment can be extrapolated to test an evolu-
tionary hypothesis. The unstated assumption is that if experimen-
tally increasing the costs of signalling results in honest signals
when animals are trained to produce a signal, then selection will
favour the evolution of such costs as a mechanism to enforce
honesty. It remains unresolved how the costs of signalling evolve,
and whether any proximate rewards for honesty that might occur
in naturewill provide enough ﬁtness beneﬁts to overcome the costs
of signalling.We agree that such learning studies provide a valuable
tool that allows one to experimentally manipulate variables that
would otherwise be difﬁcult or impossible to test, but they aremore
akin to so-called ‘proof of concept’ studies than empirical tests of
the handicap hypothesis.
CONCLUSIONS
We raised these caveats regarding the theoretical background,
interpretations and conclusions of the study by Polnaszek and
Stephens (2014) to emphasize the problems with the handicap
hypothesis and the challenges with testing this idea. Future studies
should consider the theoretical objections with the handicap hy-
pothesis, or provide more convincing justiﬁcations for why these
critiques can be ignored. The critics of the handicap hypothesis do
not question the potential role of signal costs in maintaining
honesty, and on the contrary, they classify their models as part ofthe ‘costly signalling’ paradigm. No one has shown how selection
can possibly favour costly signals because of their costs (contrary to
Zahavi, costly signals can only evolve despite, not because, of their
costs), and the jay experiment falls short of providing such evi-
dence. Future efforts to test the handicap hypothesis deﬁned as
strategic signalling costs (Maynard Smith&Harper,1995) should be
aware that distinguishing strategic from efﬁcacy costs may not be
possible even in principle. For example, if the information being
transmitted by a sender and evaluated by a receiver are the costs of
the signal, as Zahavi proposed, then all of the signalling costs are
strategic. We suggest that the jay study provides evidence that
uncheatable constraints can enforce honesty (index signal hy-
pothesis; Maynard Smith & Harper, 2004), but studies are needed
to ﬁnd an explanation for the evolution of such constraints
(Biernaskie, Grafen, & Perry, 2014).
Despite our concerns, we commend the authors on their clever
and innovative approach to studying animal signals. Showing that
signal costs enforce honesty is an important step, and we suggest
that similar experiments have great potential to provide insights
into the underlying proximate mechanisms that control receiver
psychology (Guilford & Dawkins, 1991). Studies are needed to
determine howcostly signalling evolves, andwhether costly signals
function to enforce honesty (i.e. do low-quality individuals pay a
higher marginal cost or receive more beneﬁts than high-quality
signallers?). Finally, it would be especially helpful if future studies
would identify inconsistencies, as well as the support for the
handicap hypothesis.Acknowledgments
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Table A3
Conditions of honesty according to action-response games (Hurd, 1995; Szamado,
1999)
Conditions of honesty
(Hurd, 1995; Szamado, 1999)
Conditions of honesty in the
Polnaszek and Stephens (2014) model
WlþrVl<0 1þr(ab)<0
WhþrVh>0 1þr>0
VlþrWl<Cl abr<c
VhþrWh>Ch 1þr>c
VlþrWl>0 abr>0
VhþrWh>0 1þr>0
Assuming r¼0 according to Polnaszek and Stephens (2014) modelAppendix
Conditions of honesty in action-response games
Table A1 gives the variables of a general action-response game
(Hurd, 1995; Szamado, 1999), Table A2 gives the values of these
variables according to the model by Polnaszek and Stephens (2014)
and Table A3 gives the conditions of honesty (Hurd,1995; Szamado,
1999) and the values used in the model by Polnaszek and Stephens
(2014) substituted into these conditions. One can see that assuming
r ¼ 0 we get a  b < c, the condition derived in Polnaszek and
Stephens' (2014) article. In contrast, Table A4 shows Grafen's con-
ditions (Grafen, 1990; Maynard Smith & Harper, 1995) and the
corresponding values according to the current game. Polnaszek and
Stephens (2014) provide a different set of conditions, which is not
surprising as Grafen's conditions do not describe the conditions of
honesty in action-response games (Hurd, 1995; Szamado, 1999).Table A1
Parameters and notations of the action-response game (Hurd, 1995; Szamado, 1999)
Parameter Description
W Value of the receiver's response for the receiver
V Value of the receiver's response for the signaller
C Cost of signalling
r Degree of relatedness
H High
L Low
U Up
D Down
Vh¼V(H,U)V(H,D) Difference in the value of the receiver's responses
for high-quality signallers
Vl¼V(L,U)V(L,D) Difference in the value of the receiver's responses
for low-quality signallers
Wh¼W(H,U)W(H,D) Difference in the value of the receiver's responses
for receivers with high-quality signallers
Wl¼W(L,U)W(L,D) Difference in the value of the receiver's responses
for receivers with low-quality signallers
Ch¼C(H,S)C(H,N) Difference in the cost of signals for high-quality
signallers
Cl¼C(L,S)C(L,N) Difference in the cost of signals for low-quality
signallers
Wl<0 1<0
Wh>0 1>0
Vl<Cl ab<c
Vh>Ch 1>c
Vl>0 ab>0
Vh>0 1>0
Table A4
Conditions of honesty according to Grafen (Grafen, 1990; Maynard Smith & Harper,
1995)
Grafen's conditions Grafen's conditions using the values of the
Polnaszek and Stephens (2014) model
C>0 c>0
Ch/Vh<Cl/Vl c/1<c/(ab) which results in: ab<1
